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WHO OWNS THE PAST?

Alex Schlesinger — Sun, 23 Aug 2026 20:27:21 +0000

Shared Heritage as an Instrument of Diplomacy Rather Than Geopolitical Competition

DIPLOMATIC STUDIES — BACKGROUNDER No. 001
History, Civilizations & Shared Heritage

INTRODUCTION

The past has become an increasingly active field of international competition. States seek recognition for historical figures, archaeological sites, religious traditions, languages, inventions and cultural practices as elements of national heritage. Museums face demands for restitution. Governments dispute the origins of cultural symbols. Archaeological discoveries become matters of national prestige. Historical narratives are incorporated into territorial claims, foreign-policy arguments and competing concepts of civilizational identity. None of this is inherently illegitimate. Communities have a right to preserve their memory, protect their heritage and maintain continuity with previous generations. The problem begins when historical association is transformed into exclusive historical ownership.

Human civilization did not develop within the political borders that exist today. Trade routes crossed continents, empires incorporated multiple peoples, religions migrated between languages and cultures, technologies travelled, populations mixed, stories were borrowed and retold, and political institutions were copied and transformed. Even apparently distinctive national traditions frequently contain layers inherited from much older systems of cultural exchange. Modern states therefore face a paradox: they may be legitimate custodians of particular historical traditions without necessarily being their exclusive historical owners. The distinction matters because disputes about the past increasingly influence relations in the present. Shared heritage should therefore be understood not as another territory to be divided, but as a potential infrastructure of international cooperation.

THE NEW COMPETITION FOR THE PAST

Geopolitical competition is usually understood as competition for territory, resources, technology, markets and military power. Yet another field of competition has become increasingly important: historical legitimacy. Control over historical narratives can provide states and political movements with symbolic authority. A claim to antiquity can reinforce territorial claims. Association with an ancient civilization can strengthen national identity. Religious heritage can establish symbolic continuity between contemporary political communities and sacred history. This creates powerful incentives to nationalize the past.

The resulting argument often follows a deceptively simple formula: it existed here, therefore it belongs to us, therefore we are its historical successors. History rarely follows such clean lines. The same city may have belonged to several civilizations. The same religious tradition may have passed through several languages and societies. The same technological practice may have emerged through exchanges among distant populations. The same epic narrative may contain motifs much older than the civilization that eventually recorded it. The further back we travel historically, the less useful modern political borders become. Attempts to impose contemporary national categories upon ancient history therefore risk creating an illusion of continuity where the historical reality was far more complex.

Cultural heritage is frequently described as something that naturally brings people together. It can, but it can also do precisely the opposite. Monuments become territorial markers. Archaeology is mobilized to validate political claims. Museums become arenas of diplomatic conflict. Historical anniversaries reopen unresolved disputes. Competing narratives of victimhood reproduce conflicts among generations that never experienced the original events. In extreme cases, destroying another community’s heritage becomes a way of denying that community’s historical legitimacy. Heritage policy should therefore no longer be regarded as a marginal cultural matter. It increasingly belongs to diplomacy, peacebuilding and international security.

SHARED DOES NOT MEAN OWNERLESS

One possible response is to declare all important heritage simply “the heritage of humanity.” The proposition is attractive but insufficient. Universalizing heritage can itself erase legitimate historical relationships. The Parthenon forms part of humanity’s heritage, but it is also specifically Greek. Angkor belongs to world civilization, but it cannot be separated from Cambodia. Indigenous traditions may possess universal significance while remaining inseparable from the communities that preserved them. Shared heritage therefore does not mean ownerless heritage, nor does it require cultures to abandon their distinctive identities.

A more useful principle is that heritage can possess several layers of belonging simultaneously. A historical object, tradition, person or site may belong to a local community, a religious or linguistic tradition, a nation, several nations connected through history, a wider civilization and, ultimately, humanity. These identities need not contradict one another. Conflict begins when one layer attempts to invalidate all the others.

This distinction allows us to move beyond the false choice between national ownership and abstract universalism. A society does not lose its relationship with its past simply because another society also has a legitimate relationship with the same historical phenomenon. Recognition does not have to operate as a zero-sum game. Indeed, the attempt to establish exclusive ownership over historical phenomena that emerged through centuries of migration, exchange and cultural borrowing often tells us more about contemporary politics than about the historical processes themselves.

FROM OWNERSHIP TO STEWARDSHIP

The vocabulary of heritage should consequently expand. International discussions remain dominated by concepts such as ownership, possession, origin and restitution. These are necessary legal categories, but another concept should stand beside them: stewardship. Ownership asks who something belongs to. Stewardship asks who has responsibility for preserving it, studying it, interpreting it and transmitting it to future generations. The second question frequently creates possibilities for cooperation that the first cannot provide.

Two states disputing the historical ownership of a tradition may nevertheless document it jointly. Museums disputing an artefact may conduct shared provenance research. Countries connected by an ancient trade route can construct a common digital archive. Communities with conflicting interpretations of the same historical event can preserve parallel narratives rather than forcing an artificial consensus. The objective should not always be to produce one agreed history. In many cases that is neither possible nor desirable. The objective should be to create an institutional framework within which different historical memories can coexist without becoming instruments of contemporary conflict.

This requires several principles. Historical connection should be distinguished from exclusive ownership. Multiple layers of belonging should be recognized rather than artificially reduced to a single national attribution. Archaeological, linguistic, genetic, archival and historical evidence should be clearly separated from later political narratives constructed around that evidence. Where exclusive ownership cannot resolve a dispute, shared stewardship should be considered through joint archives, common research programmes, travelling collections, digital repatriation and multinational heritage projects. Finally, heritage disputes should increasingly be treated as a field of preventive diplomacy because apparently symbolic historical controversies can become early indicators of much deeper identity, territorial and political conflicts.

A NEW ROLE FOR DIPLOMACY

Traditional diplomacy usually enters heritage disputes late. A museum receives a restitution claim. A monument becomes politically contested. An archaeological site is damaged during conflict. A government protests another country’s historical interpretation. Diplomacy then attempts to manage the consequences. The sequence should be reversed. Shared heritage can itself become a diplomatic instrument.

Countries with difficult political relationships may still cooperate around archaeology, archives, conservation, language, museums and historical research. Such cooperation can create relationships among historians, universities, museums, municipalities, religious communities and professional associations before governments are capable of resolving larger political disputes. Heritage diplomacy can therefore operate below the threshold of formal political agreement. It provides a comparatively low-risk environment in which societies can acknowledge connections without first resolving every political disagreement between them.

This changes the meaning of heritage diplomacy. Heritage is not merely something diplomacy should protect after conflict has begun. It can become an instrument through which relationships are built before conflict occurs. A shared archaeological mission, jointly curated exhibition, common historical archive or multinational research programme may appear insignificant compared with formal negotiations between governments. Yet such projects create networks of trust, professional familiarity and shared responsibility that conventional diplomacy often struggles to produce.

THE DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY

Digital technologies make a further step possible. For most of history, knowledge was organized according to institutions that possessed physical objects: archives, museums, libraries and universities. Digital environments do not require the same architecture. A single historical object can simultaneously be connected to several countries, civilizations, languages, communities, archaeological sites, academic interpretations and competing historical narratives. Instead of forcing the user to choose one category, a digital knowledge system can preserve the relationships among all of them.

This creates the possibility of moving from national collections toward connected histories. A shared-heritage environment could connect objects, places, people, historical events, archival documents, archaeological evidence, oral traditions, academic interpretations, communities and contemporary disputes. It would not need to become another universal encyclopedia presenting one supposedly authoritative account of the past. It could instead become a map of relationships among different interpretations of human history, clearly distinguishing documented evidence from hypothesis, scholarly disagreement and contemporary political narrative.

Such an architecture is particularly important because the digital organization of knowledge is never neutral. If every historical phenomenon must be assigned to one country, one culture or one civilization, the database itself reproduces the logic of exclusive ownership. If the same phenomenon can belong simultaneously to multiple historical relationships, digital infrastructure can represent the complexity that conventional political categories often conceal.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

Governments, universities, museums and international institutions should begin experimenting with practical mechanisms of shared heritage. Multinational research groups should be created for contested historical subjects, not as commissions designed to manufacture political consensus but as professional environments capable of documenting areas of agreement, disagreement and different levels of evidence. Important historical objects, traditions and phenomena could receive Shared Heritage Passports, digital records identifying all communities, territories and civilizations with documented relationships to them. Museums and archives could develop interoperable provenance databases capable of reconstructing the historical movement of important objects across institutional and national boundaries.

Heritage-dialogue mechanisms should also be established before disputes become political crises. Universities, museums and professional associations can provide neutral environments for conversations governments may find politically difficult. Competing interpretations should remain visible rather than being artificially reconciled. A mature knowledge system should distinguish established evidence, plausible interpretation, disputed interpretation and political narrative. Shared archaeological missions, archives, exhibitions and research programmes should also be treated as potential confidence-building measures between societies with difficult political relations.

The purpose of such mechanisms is not to depoliticize history. History will always have political consequences. The objective is instead to make the relationship between evidence, interpretation, identity and political use more transparent. A society should be able to say, “this is part of our history,” without requiring another society to accept the proposition that it therefore cannot also be part of theirs.

CONCLUSION

Human beings inherited the past long before they divided the contemporary world into its present states. This does not make nations irrelevant. It makes history larger than nations. The task is therefore not to erase national heritage or dissolve cultural identities into an abstract universal culture. It is to recognize a more complex reality: what is ours can also be shared.

A civilization becomes no less important when we discover that it borrowed from another civilization. A national tradition becomes no less meaningful when its deeper origins cross modern borders. A religious story does not lose its significance because related narratives existed elsewhere. Quite the opposite. Connected histories reveal the extraordinary process through which human civilization was actually constructed: through migration, exchange, borrowing, adaptation, conflict, memory and continuous reinterpretation.

The international system has spent centuries developing mechanisms for dividing territory. It now needs better mechanisms for sharing memory. The question “Who owns the past?” may therefore have no single answer. A better question is: who is prepared to take responsibility for preserving it, understanding it and allowing others to recognize themselves within it?

That question changes the nature of the problem. Heritage ceases to be merely another object of geopolitical competition and can become an infrastructure of cooperation.

DIPLOMATIC STUDIES
The Living Journal of International Affairs

Backgrounder No. 001 | History, Civilizations & Shared Heritage

This paper is intended to initiate professional discussion. Its propositions are open to evidence, critique and revision through the Diplomatic Studies working-group process.

DISCUSS · CONTRIBUTE EVIDENCE · JOIN THE WORKING GROUP

Walk In Tattoo at Prana Tattoo: Professional Ink Without the Long Wait

pranatattoo — Tue, 18 Aug 2026 10:40:16 +0000

Enjoy the Convenience of Walk In Tattoo Services

Sometimes inspiration strikes unexpectedly, and you don't want to wait weeks for an appointment. That's where walk in tattoo services at Prana Tattoo come in. Whether you've been thinking about a meaningful symbol, a small script tattoo, or a spontaneous design, our experienced artists are ready to help when availability allows. Walk-in services offer flexibility while maintaining the same high standards of quality, creativity, and professionalism as scheduled appointments.

High-Quality Tattoos Created by Experienced Artists

Choosing a walk-in tattoo doesn't mean compromising on quality. At Prana Tattoo, every client receives personalized attention from skilled tattoo artists who are passionate about their craft. Before the tattoo begins, the artist will discuss your design ideas, placement, size, and style to ensure the final artwork matches your expectations.

Whether you're interested in fine line tattoos, lettering, traditional designs, black and grey realism, or colourful artwork, the team is committed to delivering exceptional results with precision and attention to detail.

A Safe and Comfortable Tattoo Experience

Your safety and comfort are always a priority at Prana Tattoo. The studio follows strict hygiene and sterilization procedures, using professional-grade equipment and premium-quality inks for every tattoo. Each workstation is carefully prepared to provide a clean environment where clients can feel confident throughout the tattooing process.

The artists also provide clear aftercare instructions to help your tattoo heal properly and maintain its appearance for years to come.

What to Expect During Your Walk In Visit

Walk-in availability depends on the artists' schedules and the size of your requested tattoo. Smaller and less complex designs are generally easier to accommodate without an appointment, while larger custom pieces may require a consultation and future booking.

When you arrive at Prana Tattoo, the team will discuss your ideas, answer your questions, and determine whether your tattoo can be completed the same day. Their goal is to make the experience smooth, enjoyable, and professional from start to finish.

Visit Prana Tattoo for Your Next Walk In Tattoo

If you're looking for a reliable walk in tattoo studio in Montreal, Prana Tattoo offers talented artists, custom designs, and a welcoming atmosphere for every client. Whether you're getting your first tattoo or adding another piece to your collection, you can expect exceptional craftsmanship and friendly service.

Stop by Prana Tattoo to check walk-in availability or speak with the team about your tattoo ideas. Your next piece of body art could begin today with artists dedicated to creativity, quality, and customer satisfaction.

Viola Wills

Andrey Matuzov — Fri, 14 Aug 2026 13:19:03 +0000

FROM IDEAS TO DIPLOMATIC ACTION

PDA — Tue, 11 Aug 2026 08:22:05 +0000

A Global Workshop Programme for People Who Want to Help Shape the Future

The world’s most difficult problems cannot be solved by governments, diplomats or academic institutions alone. They require the knowledge and experience of people from different professions, countries, generations and cultural traditions.

People for Diplomatic Action was created to bring these people into a shared process.

It is not diplomacy for people. It is diplomacy created and carried forward by people.

The platform connects public dialogue, professional knowledge, collaborative research and project development in one continuous cycle:

Question → Discussion → Research → Cooperation → Project → Action

A New Global Workshop Every Month

People for Diplomatic Action conducts an international online workshop every month.

Each workshop is built around a major question affecting the future of international relations, human cooperation and global stability. The annual programme covers ten priority questions. Some questions may require more than one session, while the permanent intellectual architecture of the platform is organised through fourteen thematic groups.

These are not conventional webinars. Participants do not simply listen to invited speakers. They contribute articles, research, historical materials, professional cases, project proposals and practical experience.

Every workshop is designed to produce a concrete intellectual and project result:

a clearer formulation of the problem;
a map of different and competing perspectives;
new research and analytical materials;
proposals for diplomatic and institutional action;
potential international project teams;
recommendations for governments, universities, international institutions and civil society;
a public collection of the strongest contributions.

The objective is to transform a broad international audience from readers and observers into co-authors of a new global project agenda.

Fourteen Fields of Global Inquiry

The ten priority questions of the annual workshop programme are developed across fourteen permanent thematic fields:

Diplomacy & Foreign Policy
International Order & Geopolitics
War, Peace & International Security
Conflict Prevention, Mediation & Peacebuilding
Arms Control, Disarmament & Non-Proliferation
International Law, Human Rights & Justice
Global Governance & International Institutions
Economy, Trade, Finance & Development
Climate, Environment & Energy
Science, Technology, AI, Cyber & Space
Society, Identity & Political Systems
History, Civilizations & Shared Heritage
Regional Studies
Human Security, Migration & Global Health

These groups function as permanent professional communities and thematic journals. Participants may also create new groups when an emerging issue requires a separate field of inquiry.

From the Workshop to the Journal

The strongest contributions from every workshop will be selected for publication in the monthly People for Diplomatic Action Journal.

The journal will be produced in online and offline formats and may include:

analytical articles;
essays and policy papers;
research summaries;
interviews and professional dialogues;
historical and cultural materials;
project proposals;
workshop conclusions;
visual research and multimedia contributions.

Publication is not the end of the process. It is a step toward assembling people around ideas that can become real initiatives.

Authors retain their professional identity and receive visible recognition for their contribution. Every publication can be connected to the author’s profile, expertise, working groups and projects on the platform.

From the Journal to RE:THINK Dialogue 2045

The strongest authors and project contributors will be considered by the International Expert Council.

Based on the quality, originality and practical value of their work, selected participants will be invited to take part in ⁠RE:THINK Dialogue 2045.

RE:THINK Dialogue 2045 is a continuing international process that brings together independent thinkers, diplomats, scholars, entrepreneurs, engineers, cultural strategists and project leaders.

Its purpose is not to produce another declaration. It is to test whether different intellectual and civilizational traditions can develop a shared language, identify compatible visions of the future and translate them into projects, institutions and new forms of cooperation.

The inaugural dialogue was held in Shanghai, China, on 17–19 June 2026. It brought together participants from different countries and professional backgrounds for a closed, non-hierarchical working process based on the Chatham House Rule.

RE:THINK Dialogue 2045 is intended to take place twice a year in different countries. This allows the process to engage new regions, institutions and intellectual traditions while maintaining continuity between meetings.

The Next Dialogue: Muscat, Oman

The next international session of RE:THINK Dialogue 2045 is provisionally planned to take place in Muscat, Sultanate of Oman, at Sultan Qaboos University, subject to final institutional and organisational confirmation.

The university setting reflects the nature of RE:THINK Dialogue 2045 as a space connecting diplomacy, science, education, culture and practical project development.

Oman’s tradition of moderation, dialogue and diplomatic balance makes Muscat a natural location for the next stage of this international process.

Leadership and Expert Council

RE:THINK Dialogue 2045 is supported by an international structure connecting strategic leadership, operational coordination and independent expertise.

Core Leadership Team

The current leadership team includes:

Andrey Matuzov, initiator and strategic architect of RE:THINK Dialogue 2045, founder of M BALANCE Strategic Meaning Center and author of the SARAFAN concept;
Nelson Wong, Vice Chairman and President of the Shanghai Centre for RimPac Strategic and International Studies, strategic partner and co-host of the inaugural Shanghai dialogue;
Ivan Sisnev, member of the operational leadership team responsible for coordinating and developing the international programme;
Naila Qalqili, member of the operational leadership team and representative of M BALANCE, supporting international coordination, participant engagement and the human-centred format of the dialogue.

The Expert Council

The leadership team works together with the M BALANCE Expert Council, which brings together diplomats, scholars, strategists, scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, cultural figures and project leaders from different countries.

A significant part of the Expert Council consists of participants in the inaugural RE:THINK Dialogue 2045 in Shanghai. The Council is therefore not an external supervisory body. It is a working community of people who have already participated in the dialogue and understand its methodology, principles and long-term objectives.

The Expert Council:

helps formulate the annual programme of ten priority global questions;
contributes to the fourteen thematic groups of People for Diplomatic Action;
evaluates articles, research papers and project proposals produced through the monthly workshops;
votes on the selection of the strongest authors and contributors;
recommends participants for the international RE:THINK Dialogue 2045 forums;
supports the development of ideas into research, institutional proposals and practical projects;
maintains continuity between the online workshops, the journal and the international forums.

For each international session, the organisational structure is expanded to include representatives of the host country, partner universities, think tanks, professional communities and cultural institutions.

The Digital Infrastructure

From September 2026, with the support of Mongolia’s Ministry of Digital Development, Innovation and Communications, the platform will enter a new stage of development.

Its purpose is not merely to publish content. It is designed to manage and connect:

people and professional identities;
knowledge and publications;
thematic groups and communities;
workshops and collective research;
ideas and project proposals;
teams, competencies and institutional partners;
individual contributions and public results;
the transition from discussion to implementation.

A participant can create a professional profile, publish work, join a thematic group, contribute to a workshop, propose a project, find collaborators and build a visible history of contribution.

In this model, the central measure of value is not the number of followers or reactions. It is the quality of a person’s contribution to shared knowledge and practical action.

SARAFAN: The Method Behind the Process

The intellectual and methodological foundation of the programme is the ⁠SARAFAN concept.

SARAFAN treats conscience not only as a personal moral quality, but as a principle that must be built into the architecture of institutions, technologies and cooperation.

Its core regulators are:

Measure, the ability to balance ambition, consequences, risks and human limits;
Memory, the preservation and practical use of historical and cultural experience;
Conscience, the connection between knowledge, action and responsibility.

The SARAFAN methodology uses reverse horizon thinking. Participants begin with the world they would consider possible and desirable in 2045, then work backwards to identify what must be created today.

SARAFAN Alliance: From Compatibility to Cooperation

⁠SARAFAN Alliance is the project and coordination layer of this architecture.

It is not a political bloc, a supranational authority or a single ideological movement. It is an infrastructure of trust connecting people, universities, cities, cultural institutions, think tanks, businesses and communities capable of turning compatible ideas into concrete initiatives.

Within the wider architecture:

People for Diplomatic Action provides broad public participation;
the online workshops structure questions and contributions;
the journal publishes and develops the strongest work;
the Expert Council evaluates ideas and contributors;
RE:THINK Dialogue 2045 provides a high-level international dialogue;
SARAFAN Alliance helps transform compatible ideas into teams, institutions and projects;
the digital platform preserves knowledge, professional identity and documented contribution.

This creates a continuous international pathway:

Open Workshop → Expert Evaluation → Journal Publication → Project Development → RE:THINK Dialogue 2045 → SARAFAN Alliance

The First Online Workshop

Shared Past, Common Future: Reframing History as Diplomatic Action

The first online workshop addresses a question that lies behind many contemporary conflicts:

How can shared heritage be recognised without denying the distinct identities of communities?

History can connect societies, but it can also be used to divide them. Cultural symbols, archaeological sites, religious traditions, historical figures and collective memories are frequently treated as the exclusive property of one nation, religion or political project.

The workshop will examine how diplomacy can move beyond the struggle for ownership of the past and develop models of shared recognition, responsibility and cultural stewardship.

Participants will be invited to:

identify cases of contested or shared heritage;
distinguish historical research from political appropriation;
examine how museums, education and media shape collective memory;
explore models of shared custodianship;
propose diplomatic, cultural and digital instruments for protecting common heritage;
develop recommendations and practical project ideas.

Who Can Participate?

The workshop is open to people of different ages, professions, countries and cultural backgrounds, including:

historians, archaeologists and anthropologists;
diplomats and international relations specialists;
museum professionals, archivists and curators;
lawyers and cultural heritage experts;
educators and university researchers;
writers, journalists, filmmakers and artists;
religious and community representatives;
technology, AI and digital humanities specialists;
students and emerging researchers;
civic leaders and project developers;
anyone able to contribute a serious idea, documented case or practical proposal.

Formal status is not the main criterion. What matters is the quality of thought, openness to dialogue and willingness to carry an idea forward.

How to Join People for Diplomatic Action

Participation begins on the digital platform. You can enter the process at any stage, from publishing an initial idea to joining a working group or developing an international project.

1. Create Your Account

If you are not yet registered on the platform, create your personal ID.PAGE profile.

Your profile allows you to present your professional background, publications, research, projects, competencies and areas of interest.

⁠REGISTER ON THE PLATFORM

2. Join the Thematic Groups

Explore the fourteen permanent thematic groups of People for Diplomatic Action.

Join the fields connected to your experience and interests, meet other participants, follow discussions and contribute your own publications, cases and proposals.

⁠EXPLORE AND JOIN THE GROUPS

3. Register for Online Workshops

Visit the Projects section to discover current and upcoming online workshops.

Each workshop provides a pathway from individual contribution to publication, expert evaluation, project development and potential participation in RE:THINK Dialogue 2045.

⁠VIEW ALL WORKSHOPS AND PROJECTS

4. Join the Current Workshop

The first online workshop is:

Shared Past, Common Future: Reframing History as Diplomatic Action

Its central question is:

How can shared heritage be recognised without denying the distinct identities of communities?

Historians, diplomats, researchers, cultural professionals, educators, writers, community representatives, students and project developers are invited to contribute.

⁠JOIN THE CURRENT WORKSHOP

Every workshop begins with a question. Every participant can add knowledge. Every strong contribution can become a publication. Every publication can lead to a team. Every team can initiate a project. The strongest authors and project leaders can continue the process at RE:THINK Dialogue 2045.

From audience to co-authors. From publications to projects. From ideas to diplomatic action.

PEOPLE FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION

A Global Platform for Ideas, Projects and Cooperation

⁠diplomacy.id.page

Yuval Noah Harari is telling his story based on Sarafan framework

Andrey Matuzov — Mon, 10 Aug 2026 05:30:23 +0000

Отто Скорцени на службе Моссад

Alex Schlesinger — Sat, 8 Aug 2026 05:50:46 +0000

Большой друг СССР, Герой Советского Союза Гамаль Абдель Насер, придя к власти в 1956, пригласил в Египет несколько сотен квалифицированных нацистов - для организации пропаганды, реформы образования, органов безопасности и армии. Чтобы успешно бороться с Израилем.

Например, старого партайгеноссе Йоханна фон Леерса, близкого соратника Геббельса, скрывавшегося от суда в Аргентине, пригласили, чтобы организовать антисемитскую пропаганду в арабском мире. Под Леерса создали специальный орган, "Институт изучения сионизма". Леерс принял ислам и новое имя, Омар Амин. Материалы и методические указания Леерса распространялись по всему Ближнему Востоку. Правительство Западной Германии требовало выдачи Леерса, но Египет отказал.

Крупным консультантом Насера был Отто Скорцени, легендарный глава диверсантов СС, любимец фюрера, который выкрал Муссолини из заключения. Скорцени собрал в Египте целую команду из генералов вермахта и начальников гестапо, которые обучали египетскую армию и спецназ.

Египет также пригласил нацистов для развития собственной военной ракетной программы. Это были разработчики ракет из Пенемюнде, которые отказались от работы на фон Брауна в Америке ради выгодного и анти-израильского египетского контракта. В 1962 году Египет внезапно для всего мира провел успешные ракетные испытания, и приступил к разработке специальных боеголовок (в т.ч. с радиоактивными отходами).

Тут события приобрели некоторый киношный оборот.

Несмотря на попытки организовать охрану с помощью того же Скорцени, немецкие ракетчики либо бесследно исчезли, либо получили специальные взрывающиеся посылки. Это была операция "Дамокл", проведенная Моссадом. После "Дамокла" ракетная программа Египта как-то не задалась.

Киношность в том, что, по не так давно рассекреченным материалам, ликвидацию организовал, с личным участием, сам Отто Скорцени. Потому что с начала 60-х гг. Скорцени стал работать на Моссад!

***

На фото - Отто Скорцени

—-------------------------------

Публикация Евгений Пескин

Примечание: чтобы упредить маловерных, прилагаю ссылку к описанию одной из операций Моссада с участием Скорцени. https://stmegi.com/posts/33296/otto-skortseni-natsist-stavshiy-naemnym-ubiytsey-mossada/

Стратегическое мышление Вьетнама во время Третьей Индокитайской войны

Alex Sobak — Thu, 6 Aug 2026 00:41:57 +0000

Какой, однако, большой объём литературы, посвященный коммунизму XX века, существует на английском языке, и как мы мало все это знаем.

Но информационные технологии будут, надеюсь менять ситуацию к лучшему.

Вот еще одна книжка, теперь уже Юго-Восточная Азия.

Мы, конечно, помним, что все это исследуется, пишется и издается в цитадели современного империализма, а потому идеологически окрашено, но свои мозги включать тоже не самое последнее занятие в этой жизни.

На Патреоне, в открытом виде, включая оригинальный файл на английском. Патреон в России заблокирован.

«Стратегическое мышление Вьетнама во время Третьей Индокитайской войны». На основе уникальных архивных материалов Государственного архива № 3 в Ханое, ранее недоступных исследователям, Косаль Пат пересматривает устоявшиеся объяснения вторжения Вьетнама в Камбоджу в декабре 1978 года. Автор убедительно доказывает, что решение Ханоя было не иррациональным актом марксистско-ленинского интернационализма или проявлением вековых имперских амбиций, а холодным стратегическим расчётом, продиктованным экзистенциальным экономическим кризисом внутри страны и военной угрозой со стороны китайско-кхмерского альянса. Книга вскрывает острую внутриполитическую борьбу между милитаристской фракцией Ле Зуана и реформистским крылом, возглавляемым Нгуен Ко Тхаком и Во Ван Киетом, показывая, как издержки войны на два фронта в конечном счёте сделали неизбежным поворот к политике обновления «Дой Мой» в 1986 году. Это исследование предлагает принципиально новый взгляд на природу вьетнамской внешней политики, утверждая примат материальных факторов и внутриполитических императивов над идеологическими доктринами и раскрывая механизмы принятия решений в одной из самых закрытых политических систем мира.

https://www.patreon.com/kommari/posts/path-kosal-third-165469733

Как мифы стали основой всей западной культуры? Мифология древних греков | Евгений Жаринов

HISTORY Index — Thu, 30 Jul 2026 14:01:50 +0000

Ride or Die 2026

Max Parfenchikov — Sat, 25 Jul 2026 09:14:05 +0000

https://m.vkvideo.ru/video-163306979_456251170

Russian Oligarch's True Warning Hidden in Plain Sight

ID.PAGE — Sat, 11 Jul 2026 11:15:58 +0000

SIMPLICIUS

JUL 11, 2026

The Economist published two important pieces centered on Russian “oligarch” Andrey Melnichenko, who is labeled one of Russia’s most ‘enigmatic’ wealth titans despite at times occupying first place amongst Russia’s richest men as, what Economist calls, the world’s “fertilizer king” and Russia’s “biggest industrialist”. He’s presented as particularly unique due to his more “centrist” position as someone who’s both inhabited Putin’s inner circle, yet also spent years living the Westernized liberal and Europhile lifestyle typical to Russian billionaires.

The first piece is a kind of introduction to him, while the second piece is an oped written by him and given tribune on the Economist as a kind of urgent message to the world about Russia.

https://www.economist.com/1843/2026/07/09/a-top-russian-oligarch-breaks-the-silence

The piece is long and filled with some interesting revelations. In its quest to skew the narrative toward the usual “Kremlinology” talking points of oligarchs serving a powerful undemocratic Russian autocrat, the Economist instead inadvertently gives light to contradictory realities. It exposes the fact, for instance, that contrary to the West’s beliefs, oligarchs in Russia had already been without real political power for some time, though the writers would never dare utter the reason why:

When Putin invaded Ukraine, the world waited for Russia’s rich and powerful to speak against the war. But they stayed quiet. The West imposed sanctions on them, partly to make them apply pressure on Putin. But this betrayed a lack of understanding of how power worked in Russia—the business elite had long given up trying to influence politics.

The journal admits that Western sanctions actually did the opposite of their intent, and pushed Russian elite back into the state’s bosom, with Melnichenko—who chose to live in Switzerland for a long portion of his life—himself admitting that for the first time he felt Russia was his only home:

Putin himself was worried the oligarchs would betray him. Instead sanctions pushed them back into his embrace. Yet when they returned, they repatriated their interests and ambitions along with their money. Melnichenko’s opening gambit when our conversations began three months ago was: “For the first time I feel I have no other country but Russia.” Given the reticence of his peers, it is astonishing that Russia’s most enigmatic oligarch, while living in Moscow, is willing to put his head above the parapet and lay his views on the record.

It goes on to even admit that, following the onset of the SMO, the Russian state did in fact begin confiscating oligarchs’ assets and returning them to “loyalists”:

At around that time he and other businessmen realised that the war would not end soon. With no reprieve from sanctions in sight, they started to repatriate themselves back to Russia, where they faced a different kind of threat to their assets.

Property rights in Russia had always been conditional. But the war unleashed a rapacity that hadn’t been seen for decades. Since 2023, assets worth $60bn have been nationalised or handed over to loyalists. It was the biggest redistribution of property since the mass privatisations of the 1990s.

In August 2023 prosecutors sought to confiscate Sibeco, a Siberian power plant, from Melnichenko, arguing that his purchase of it had involved fraudulent collusion with the previous owner. Two weeks later, the prosecutor-general’s office backed down in return for Melnichenko making a donation to a “charitable organisation”. According to people familiar with the settlement, the sum was 32bn roubles ($335m)—the same amount that Melnichenko had originally paid for Sibeco. The charitable organisation was Sirius, a school for gifted children favoured by Putin.

This is important to understand because it highlights this Economist series’ entire underlying thread, which is that the SMO has been slowly revolutionizing Russian society, turning the oligarchs back from liberalized sixth columnists to nation-serving adherents in the manner of China.

Melnichenko was amongst the first and most astute to recognize what must be done. He decided to get back in good favor with his motherland, which he had begun to use merely as a source of extraction and profits while he enjoyed life abroad. He returned and began to ingratiate himself with Russian elites, re-learning the system and re-absorbing the true national ‘pulse on the ground’:

Melnichenko now knew that he needed to establish property rights in Russia. The only way to do this was to work his way into the system, understand the competing interests and help shape its objectives. “If you want a seat at the table, you have to do something.”

As always he began by observation. “In 2023 I started to spend more time in Russia and was getting to know it in a much deeper way.” He talked to anyone who had a stake and a viewpoint: “politicians, journalists, thinkers, liberals, nationalists, communists”. He could be found having breakfast with Dmitry Muratov, the Nobel prizewinner and founding editor of Novaya Gazeta, a liberal newspaper, who was ostracised by the government and branded a “foreign agent”. In the evening he might have tea with Alexander Dugin, a nationalist philosopher who glorifies the war.

But here’s where the entire Economist series hinges. In his quest to re-integrate into Russian society, Melnichenko discovered that Russian elites are confounded and lack a unified vision of a workable future, for the time being. He then notes that Russia is seen as standing at a crossroads between four different potentialities, all of which sound grim, and which the Economist uses as the chief centerpiece to hook the series’ narrative on.

But it is a deliberately misleading hook, because they disingenuously present it as Melnichenko’s visions of a collapsing Russia with no options. In reality, Melnichenko presented the four “doom” scenarios in order to really pose his fifth redemptive one.

And what is that? To find out, we must peer into the second piece, written by the man himself:

https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/07/09/why-a-broken-russia-is-bad-for-the-world

In the piece, he keeps a deliberately neutral language in regard to the Ukrainian conflict, never quite openly blaming Ukraine or Russia, despite rumors he had been outspoken against the Russian SMO in the past. Now he’s clearly treading a fine line, and hoping for resolution which benefits himself, as well as society.

Critically, the theme of his entire piece can be condensed into one word: Sovereignty.

He accuses the West of trying to undermine and sabotage Russian sovereignty, and carefully implies that the broader conflict between Russia and the West revolves around the West’s disintegrating security architectures viewing Russian sovereignty as a threatto them—which is precisely accurate and true.

From his piece:

Russia today possesses sovereignty: it has made and continues to make its decisions independently. This is not an evaluative judgment but a descriptive one. Russia has defined its vital interests, possesses the material base to defend them and bears the consequences of its own decisions.

The current Western discourse on post-war Russia, for all its variation in political packaging, aims at one thing: the destruction of that sovereignty or its radical limitation. The logic is understandable. If Russian sovereignty is perceived as a threat, its elimination seems to solve the problem.

He goes on to pose the four scenarios, though it must be said, he specifically notes these are scenarios being discussed in the West—a stark contradiction to the Economist’s attempted painting of these “harrowing” outcomes as those feared by Russian elites as represented by Melnichenko.

You see, he doesn’t warn of any “looming disaster” facing Russia, but rather paraphrases threats the West itself is scripting, which is an all-too-inconvenient fact for the Economist staff who rather spin it in a more sensational way. It serves their agenda to pretend it’s “Putin’s own oligarchs” who are sounding the alarm of Russia’s “coming collapse”.

The four scenarios Melnichenko gives are:

“A humiliated Russia lingering on the periphery of the West.”
Russia becomes a vassal of China, ending its relationship with the West.
Russia becomes fragmented and falls apart like the USSR.
Russia becomes a “fortress: closed, mobilized, in permanent siege”, and a state of “perpetual emergency.”

As stated, these are Western fantasies, and the ‘Overton window’ of Russia’s future that Western politicians and pundits alike would like us to believe is the only trajectory of Russia’s fate. Melnichenko tacitly disagrees, but cleverly makes sure not to make this too obvious as he’s writing for a Western audience for the purpose of reconciliation.

Melnichenko finally reaches the inescapable conclusion, which is that the very heart of the conflict revolves around the issue of Russian sovereignty, and by ignoring this, the Europeans doom the conflict toward existential escalation:

How Russia conducts its own political process and towards what ends it directs its sovereignty is a question that can be resolved only inside Russia itself, without deference to external preferences. Any attempt to manage this process from outside is not only doomed but counterproductive: it destroys the very condition—sovereignty—without which sustainable peace is impossible in principle. This must be accepted, not out of sympathy for Russia but from the understanding that no alternative to this recognition exists.

He goes on to lay out a rather brilliantly nested exegesis which is a message, and a hidden threat, to the Western order. Like a Matryoshka doll, he conceals this message beneath layers of “openness” that appear ostensibly as calls for understanding and cooperation with the West. In reality, what he’s laying out is his accurate portent for Russia’s future, one where businesses, oligarchs and citizens alike, all work toward a common sovereign revolution. This is sold as being beneficial to the West because, as he foresees things, it creates “predictable” stability—but the real threat is hidden in the message that the West is pushing Russia to become more unified and powerful than ever before.

I have grounds to believe this reckoning will come, and these grounds can only be understood by explaining why it has not come sooner.

Those who built the new Russia—entrepreneurs, scientists, artists, sportsmen, professionals who created its economy, its meaning, its reputation in the world—largely saw themselves as internationalists. This was neither weakness nor naivety. It was the obvious choice in a world where global integration seemed irreversible. Science operated by international standards, technology came from the best sources, rights and obligations were governed by Western law in Western courts, children studied at the world’s best universities, capital was placed where it was protected. This choice meant, consciously or not, the transfer of a significant part of sovereignty to external systems. Not because that was the desire. Because it seemed that the rules were neutral and access was open to all.

After spelling out how the new Russia was built by internationalists, he admits that globalization was a failure because it was nothing more than a ruse to take away Russia’s sovereignty:

For many years Russia’s authorities warned that this was a mistake. The advocates of global integration viewed this as a remnant of Soviet thinking. Time has proved them wrong, not because globalisation did not exist but because it was never neutral.

Sanctions showed this plainly. They were written by some, in the interests of some, and can be revised for others by political decision. My own experience of Western sanctions matters here not as a personal grievance, but as evidence that the infrastructure of globalisation is politically conditional. Assets can be frozen; rights once considered inviolable dissolve the moment a political decision is taken.

The systemic effect of sanctions proved broader than their original intent. Disconnection from global systems—financial, technological, legal, educational—confronted Russia’s creative class with a choice it had not anticipated: either full emigration with the severing of all ties, or a return to the question it had been avoiding for three decades: how to build its own world inside Russia, by its own rules, to its own standards.

He concludes that this process of rebuilding Russia as a self-contained ecosystem, “by its own rules, to its own standards” will not come fast or easy, but it is now fatefully ensured:

This process is neither fast nor easy. But it is inevitable, since the global world in its former sense no longer exists. Those who know how to create find themselves choosing not between Russia and a global space, but between Russia and a fragmented world in which each bloc builds its own rules. Under these conditions, the logic of creation points inward: to build something that will be attractive—to those who left long ago with the dissolved Soviet Union, to those who left recently, and to the Russian-speaking world at large.

Layered even deeper in his admonishment is the prediction that expats and Russian businesses alike—particularly those which may have sold out in the beginning, it is implied—will again eventually find their home in Russia:

Large Russian businesses that invest in a sovereign Russia will, in time, become an integral part of it. The same will hold for other important institutions. As a consequence, Russia itself will become different. If we strive for a sovereignty that creates unity between citizens and institutions, I hope that in time we will correct all the internal imbalances for which we too bear responsibility—through the fact that we were once glad to absent ourselves.

In closing, he argues that such a sovereign, internally coherent, and unified Russia will not please the West, but it will be a far safer option than a Russia destabilized and fractured to the point of dangerous unpredictability:

The attraction of predictability

A sovereign Russia will not make every country comfortable. But it will be more advantageous in the long run than the alternatives. The choice for external players is not between a friendly Russia and a hostile one. It is between a Russia whose behaviour is predictable and one whose trajectory is unknown. In the world taking shape now, predictability is more important than sympathy.

The internal discussion about what Russia should be is inevitable. But that conversation belongs after the war and inside the country.

Once more, buried within the goodwill courtesies and ingratiating overtures toward the West, Melnichenko infact subtly retraces Putin’s own longstanding call for a renewal of the Westphalian system which the West itself had long abandoned:

The choice before the world is not between love for Russia and hatred of it, between punishment and forgiveness, between moral clarity and political cynicism. It is between two kinds of future: one in which major powers again learn to respect each other’s sovereignty, and one in which each attempts to reduce the others to objects of management. The second path has already brought us here.

The most important thing is that we step back from the abyss. Only then can we ask how we reached it and how to arrange the world differently. That work belongs to the next generation. Our role is to ensure they have something to work with.

In short, Melnichenko’s piece is in effect a Trojan horse of sorts: With a subtle appeal to the West’s sympathies—and its ego—meant to lull and disarm Western readers to his true message, he deftly delivers the thematic heart of Putin’s own longstanding arguments, famed from the days of the seminal 2007 Munich speech.

The Economist appeared to sense this hidden subversion in Melnichenko’s language and was forced to quickly publish a third additional ‘addendum’ piece simply to reframe his message to the tune of the correct narrative.

https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/07/09/the-man-who-would-change-russia

This unprecedented third piece of the day on the same topic is brief and to the point—only a few paragraphs in length. Its purpose is obvious: to control the narrative by highlighting only the most superficial platitudes and inferred “warnings” of Russia’s collapse, while burying the deeper hidden message which unequivocally declares that the West is pushing Russia into a historic reawakening of its national soul, wherein oligarch, corporate powers, and citizens alike unite under one common purpose of betterment for the nation.

The new piece above goes into full damage control mode, disingenuously miscasting Melnichenko’s return to Russia as a bid to save the country from internal “rot”:

…he has lived by Mr Putin’s rules—make money, but keep your nose out of politics. He is talking now because he and his fellow tycoons can no longer afford to ignore the rot of a country they watched descend into tyranny.

In reality, Melnichenko himself clearly states he came back not because of Russia’s corruption, but due to the West’s own unhinged and unprincipled immorality—sanctioning and seizing his assets, etc. Economist shills even openly wrote a disclaimer in order to distance themselves from Melnichenko’s thoughts, just in case their readers happened to intuit the true message beyond the Economist’s superficially phony “collapse” narrative:

Mr Melnichenko issued his warning in over 60 hours of interviews with The Economist (see 1843) and more guardedly in an essay that we are publishing online. This is the first time an oligarch inside Russia has spoken out at such length. We are giving him space not because we agree with all his views or he is a champion of democracy and human rights. Instead he is a pragmatist who wants his businesses to thrive. That is why his call could resonate in a country where wars gone wrong, including the defeat to Japan in 1905, have led to campaigns by industrialists for political change.

In short, the damage control piece desperately tries to change the message, but to those who know how to read carefully, Melnichenko’s words are clear: the war is the West’s fault, and Russia is being restructured as a self-sufficient society of supreme sovereignty where even the previously-alienated liberal class of exiles and pariahs has returned with newfound patriotism in its veins. A nation where oligarchs and big businesses are increasingly working for the benefit of the state and its people, rather than the crooked Western system which deceived and betrayed them.

The Economist tepidly tries to spin this message into an epigram about “reform”, and how the current moment is supposed to reflect the period following Russia’s loss to Japan in 1907, culminating in the Tsar’s overthrow during the later revolution. This is wishful thinking and naked sophistry on the part of the Economist staff, who are too terrified to voice Melnichenko’s true thesis.

It is a sure sign of the times that even Russia’s so-called “oligarchs” are now warning the West that it has freed the Russian genie from the bottle, and that there will be no turning back. But, as per usual, the message has fallen on deaf ears, because the Western system has decayed to such a degree that it can at this point function only on lies, propaganda, and deliberate misinterpretation.

In the West’s fragile court, the acquittal of a single truth is now too dangerous a risk.

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